Money and Modernization in Early Modern England (forthcoming at the Financial History Review)

In early modern England, coin supply increased a lot without prices responding proportionally:

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This contradicts the Quantity Theory of Money, according to which the changes should move together. If the money supply doubles, prices should double too, because the quantity theory assumes income and velocity to be constant (at least in the long run).

Here I show just coin supply, so a very narrow measure of the money supply. Broader money supply must have increased even more, as forms of paper money and credit developed at this time. This makes things look even worse for the quantity theory.

While the Quantity Theory looks bad, there is no contradiction with the equation of exchange, which simply states that nominal GDP equals velocity times money. Nor could there be, as the equation of exchange just an accounting identity.

In my forthcoming Financial History Review paper, “Money and Modernization in Early Modern England”, I explain what was going on. I argue that monetization helped support economic growth and structural change. If real growth happens, money can increase without a response of prices.

If you are interested, you can read the paper here.

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Interested in doing a PhD in Economic History?

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This blog’s most popular post of all time is my post from 2 years ago where I write about “Where can you study for a MA/MSc in Economic History?” Since writing then, students have asked me to do the same for PhDs, including a couple of people who commented on the previous post.

I will start by saying that if you are reading this in February 2019, then you are still in time to apply to the ESRC 4-years fully funded PhD position which is now open. This is specifically to work with me, Nuno Palma, and Prof. Akos Valentinyi) on an Economic History dissertation. In this case, it needs to be on a specific topic, as described in the ad, due to the nature of the funding. But we also accept applications for our regular PhD program, where you can write a PhD dissertation focused on economic history (usually I’d be your supervisor since I’m the department of economics’ economic historian; but we have plenty of other economic historians in the History faculty as well). We give about 10 full scholarships per year, and more students come in with external funding.

I’ll focus especially on Europe in this post (and I’m sure there are great places that I am not thinking of at the moment!). In Europe, we have some of the best universities in the world for doing a PhD in Economic History. This is one of the few fields in economics where I think European institutions really are on par if not ahead of the best US universities. This is related to factors beyond the scope of this post, but one factor which also helps is the wealth of archival material that we have in Europe.

In the UK, the University of Oxford, the London School of Economics, the University of Cambridge, the University of Warwick, and my own University of Manchester are all recommended. Oxford and the LSE have what is probably the biggest concentration of economic historians in the world. The research group of Oxford is exceptional, and the Department of Economic History of the LSE also has some of my favorite economic historians. Cambridge doesn’t have as many people, but is also good, having the excellent Sheilagh Ogilvie in the economics department, and people such as Chris Briggs in the Faculty of History.

Oxford offers a DPhil in Economic and Social History, and the LSE a PhD in Economic History; but if you have more technical training you may prefer to do a PhD economics (the LSE’s department of Economics does have an economic historian, and an excellent one at that, Jeremiah Dittmar). But even before he was hired, people such as Reka Juhasz were writing Economic History dissertations with other supervisors in the department of economics. I’d say that the LSE’s economics department has many open-minded faculty members which you could talk to. I myself work with Tim Besley (and other co-authors) on matters related to economic history. Tim is not an economic historian, but he is open-minded about economic history as a field.

There are other places in Europe which have consistently produced good economic historians. In the Netherlands, the University of Utrech has the biggest concentration of economic historians, which include the world-class Jan Luiten van Zanden, among several other excellent faculty members. They always have lively seminar. The University of Groningen, where I worked two years, has economic historians in both the History and the Economics departments. They have the Maddison project there, and an annual Maddison lecture on topics generally related to economic history. There are also regular economic history (and growth/development) seminars. Either would be a very viable option to do a PhD specializing in Economic History. See also the Posthumus Institute offers a PhD program. Finally, Wageningen University comes to mind as another place that is active in economic history.

In Spain, Carlos III has a PhD program in Economic History, and a regular seminar. The University of Barcelona and others have departments of economic history with good faculty.

In Germany, Joerg Baten has had many successful students at Tuebingen.

In Sweden, there are several departments of Economic History, but the University of Lund comes to mind as the best, measured by the quality and quantity of their faculty members and students. They offer a PhD programme in Economic History.

In Denmark, both the University of Copenhagen and especially the University of Southern Denmark have an excellent concentration of scholars and offer PhD programs where you can write economic history dissertations.

In Switzerland, the University of Zurich has Joachim Voth, who has had many exceptionally successful students over the years.

In the USA, economic history is typically done in departments of economics, which usually only have one or two economic historians (or, very often, zero). Several top economics departments such as Harvard, MIT, Northwestern, Berkeley,  Stanford, and UCLA have produced stellar economic historians over the years. It should be noted that you need a very solid mathematical background to enter these programs. US History departments are generally not recommended, at least if you want to the quantitative, comparative sort of economic history which gets published in the best economic history journals. There may be some exceptions to this rule, but not many.

The website eh.net has an old list of places that offer PhD programs (generally in economics) where you can specialize in Economic History, with a special focus on the US. It should be noted, however, that this list is very out of date – some of these places don’t have an economic history faculty member anymore, and some of the people listed as part of a particular university have since moved (for example, as noted above, Joachim Voth is no longer at Pompeu Fabra).

If I was you, I’d have a look at all the programs which I mentioned above and apply to all of those that you feel would be a good fit for you. If you are an undergraduate student, you need to realize that admission to PhD programs (especially with full funding) is very competitive these days (you probably already know that!). So, it may make sense to do a MSc first – you can read my previous post about that here.

Good luck!

 

 

 

 

 

Roessner on culture and growth (Highlight III)

This post continues the “Highlight” series, which has previously included posts by Ridolfi and Malinowski. It has been written by my colleague Philipp Roessner, who is a faculty member at the History faculty of the University of Manchester.

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Thinking about growth?

For ages people have pondered about the origins and nature of the wealth of nations. Adam Smith was neither the first nor the most original thinker in this department (see [Hörnigk 1684] Rössner 2018, introduction pp. 1-120). Noble prizes have been awarded (e.g. Paul Romer in 2018) for developing sophisticated theoretical approaches to growth. Economists and historians have highlighted various possible reasons for why some countries grew rich whilst others didn’t, or did so only late (the famous divergence and convergence debates). The most common origins of prosperity suggested today are geography (e.g. Landes 1998, Jones 2003), education, market size and market integration, resource endowment, institutions (e.g. Acemoglu & Robinson 2012), or the role of the state (Reinert 2008; Vries 2015, Parthasarathi 2011).

The “hockey stick” metaphor for the abrupt shift in trend growth of per capita GDP in the West from pre-modern agrarian to industrial growth around 1750 has stuck. It continues to bemuse economists and historians alike. Between 1800 and 1970 growth in the west exploded. Previous centuries had seen modest expansion, if at all. Entire rainforests have been cleared for the paper used in the publications attempting to solve the puzzle.

No one however, has tackled the obvious solution. And that is economic mentality (Rössner 2016). In recent years, historians and economists have turned to it, but indirectly. Most of them chose to focus on (sometimes ill-defined) aspects of “culture.” Mokyr has, in two fascinating books, evoked the Enlightenment (2011) and a more long-lived European “culture of growth” (2017) as ultimate causes for the European “miracle” (Mokyr 2011; Mokyr 2017). Another challenging hypothesis explaining the Hockey Stick has been advanced by McCloskey and the evocation of bourgeois value, culture and dignity (McCloskey 2006, 2010, 2017). But history has shown us that bourgeois entrepreneurs most of the time did exactly the opposite of what such lofty moral claims about their “dignity” commanded. The commercial revolution of the Atlantic and Asian economy (1650s-1750s) brought us tobacco, sugar and other exotic products creating a European culture of consumers (Trentmann 2017). It set the scene for the industrial revolution. But it was built on the suffering, enslavement and exclusion of others. Who asked the Indian textile manufacturer for their consent to the process (who was expelled from the world market by means of the British protectionist mercantilist customs and tariff system, see Parthasarathi 2011), or the Afro-American slave working on the Caribbean sugar plantation, or the Black US-American slave working in the cotton fields that fed Manchester’s burgeoning cotton mills in the 1800s? Not so much dignity to be found in the “bourgeois” process of capital formation on the eve of the industrial revolution, right?

So, if neither bourgeois values nor hard data really explain the origins and causes of growth (they are good at describing, in metrics, what happened, an important yet often overlooked difference), then what does? We need to get intellectual history into the picture, that is our economic cosmology. We know how important “Big Stories” and myths are in structuring human reality (Midgley 2011). For instance, since David Ricardo we to believe in the virtues of free trade, albeit we have tantamount empirical evidence to the opposite. Yet the “free trade makes a free world and vice versa” myth is an important part of our daily routine and reality. Because if we give up on this important cultural value the world will fall to the Lord of The Rings, Sauron, Mordor, or – more concrete in our time – the Trumps of our time. In a similar way what I would like to call “economic cosmologies” are important markers structuring reality. We use them to navigate the unknown waters of the future. They may be the most powerful forces moving the economy and economic development.

But why has economic cosmology not been taken up in models of economic growth and development? This is, of course, impossible to answer. But just consider the possibilities of adding it into the picture. Call it the history of economic analysis (as Joseph Schumpeter, the famous Austrian-US economist did), the history of economic reasoning (Karl Pribram, another influential Austrian economist and historian of economic thought), or, as it is most commonly known today, the “history of economic thought”. There’s a handful of prime journals in the field, most notably History of Political Economy (known, quite aptly, by its acronym HOPE), or the History of Economic Thought. It is all there. But the intellectual history of modern economic growth happens in the backyard still. Neither historians nor economists really bother about it, even though some of the most influential economists of the twentieth century either studied history or happened to be historians – Robert Lucas and Joseph Schumpeter, to name but two.

To cut a long story short: Economic mentality, the way we think about economy, can manifestly change the way we do economy and economic growth. As soon as people believed in the possibility of economic growth, economic growth became a possibility. It began to happen. It really is that simple. The Ancient Greeks and medieval economists and theologians known as “Scholastics” did not bother about growth. Instead they developed increasingly sophisticated models of market exchange, business and price formation (in fact, they were comparatively relaxed about business, the taking of interest and the making of profit; no wonder, since many churchmen in the middle ages came from successful merchant families). Until the 1650s the dominant economic literature of the day, first the Scholastic treatises on money and markets, then the somewhat weird economics genre known as “household management” (Hausväterliteratur) never paid much attention to modelling growth. This is because people did not associate growth, or economic expansion more generally, with positive qualities. Other economic goals were held more important – being a successful estate manager, keeping your money together, saving your soul from Purgatory, or just being a decent businessman with decent profit, but not over the top. Growth – of your business, of your nation – was simply off the radar.

Then, around 1600 something changed. The reasons of it are still ill-understood. But the present author is working on it currently. Just consider two examples. After the disastrous Thirty Years War (1618-1648) the Holy Roman Empire (“Germany”) lay in shackles. Capital had been destroyed, as had human souls by the awful woes of the big war. In the wake of this war a handful of economists known as “Cameralists” began to develop comprehensive models of restructuring economy (Reinert & Rössner 2016). Their models built on improving productivity and efficiency, promoting domestic industry and value-added activities (most likely to be found in manufacturing: Brexiteers, listen up!). It was all about generating useful knowledge and added value. They also started modelling the open human-economic future. This was an important departure from a world where the only “real” future had been Armageddon, that is the pretext to the Second Coming of Christ. Cameralists such as Veit Seckendorff (who produced his main work Teutsche Fürsten-Stat in 1655, “The German Princely State”), or Johann Heinrich Justi (1717-1771), Germany’s most prolific economic writer in the Enlightenment, wrote extremely successful textbooks on economics and state administration which went through ten or more editions. Their books continued to be read long after their authors had died and would be translated into Russian, French and Italian, sometimes even English (Reinert et al. 2017). They did not always use the word “growth”, mainly because the contemporary German word for growth (“Wachsthum”) referred to plant growth. But they knew what economic growth was – per capita GDP growth as we would say today –, and how it could be achieved. And they developed increasingly sophisticated methods of achieving it.

Or in post-1648 Sweden, where thinkers around chancellor Axel Oxenstierna, Bengt Skytte, later on the famous biologist Carl Linnaeus/Linné developed models of infinite growth based on a cornucopia of knowledge expansion. As Wennerlind has shown, the Swedish Age of Greatness (1648-1721), when Sweden as the “Lion in the North” nearly turned the Baltic Sea into a Swedish inland lake, begot a wave of scientific discovery. Networks of natural and economic science flourished (Wennerlind 2016). The Swedish wave of economic discovery around 1648 rested upon the conviction that the human-economic future was plannable and manageable. If only the correct tools of natural science and natural discovery were chosen, this could be the road towards indefinite growth. Swedish thinkers, often connected related to pan-European science networks, such as the English Hartlib Circle in England or Sophopolis, an imagined European community of wisdom, unlocked the keys towards infinite growth. This programme was based on useful knowledge, natural discovery, promotion of education, scientific research and innovation, providing the foundations of the intellectual movement commonly known as Enlightenment.

This seems to me what Romer, in one of his famous articles (Romer 1998), has called increasing marginal returns on knowledge, something that is crucial for economic growth. It was there, in the heart of Europe and beyond, in the 1650s. Let me reiterate: The explanation of the “Hockey Stick” really is dead simple. After 1650, there was a switch in the European economic mind. Before that people did not think of growth as a virtue.  They thought more of balance, conservation, just prices. They simply were not interested in growth. After 1650 more and more thinkers began to see growth as something desirable and feasible. So, it seems to me we should do more work on the history of economic thought when trying to explain the history as well as mechanics of growth.

References:

Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty (New York: Crown 2012)

Eric L. Jones, The European Miracle: Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003)

David S. Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999)

Deirdre McCloskey, The Bourgeois Virtues: Ethics for an Age of Commerce (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2006)

Deirdre McCloskey, Bourgeois Dignity: Why Economics Can’t Explain the Modern World (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2010)

Deirdre McCloskey, Bourgeois Equality: How Ideas, Not Capital or Institutions, Enriched the World (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2017)

Mary Midgley, The Myths We Live By, new ed. (London & New York: Routledge, 2011)

Joel Mokyr, Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017)

Joel Mokyr, The Enlightened Economy: Britain and the Industrial Revolution 1700-1850, (London: Penguin, 2011)

Prasannan Parthasarathi, Why Europe Grew Rich and Asia Did Not: Global Economic Divergence, 1600–1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011)

Erik S. Reinert, How Rich Countries Got Rich and Why Poor Countries Stay Poor (London: Constable, 2007)

Erik S. Reinert, Kenneth Carpenter, Fernanda A. Reinert, Sophus A. Reinert, “80 Economic Bestsellers before 1850: A Fresh Look at the History of Economic Thought”, Tallinn University of Technology Working Papers in Technology Governance and Economic Dynamics no. 74 (2017),  http://hum.ttu.ee/wp/paper74.pdf

Erik S. Reinert and Philipp Robinson Rössner, “Cameralism and the German Tradition of Development Economics,” in: Erik S. Reinert/Jayati Ghosh/Rainer Kattel (eds.), Elgar Handbook of Alternative Theories of Economic Development (Cheltenham/Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2016), pp. 63-86.

Paul M. Romer, “Increasing Returns and Long Run Growth”, Journal of Political Economy 94, No. 5 (1986), 1002-1037

Philipp Robinson Rössner, ‘Entangled Worlds or Cultural Bifurcation? Comments on the Intellectual Origins of the Great Divergence and Modern Economic Growth, c. 1500-2000 A.D.’, in: COMPARATIV | Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 3/16 (2016)

Philipp Robinson Rössner (ed.), Philipp Wilhelm von Hörnigk’s Austria SUPREME (if It So Wishes)’. A Strategy for European Economic Supremacy (1684). transl. Keith Tribe

Frank Trentmann, Empire of Things: How We Became a World of Consumers, from the Fifteenth Century to the Twenty-First (London: Penguin, 2017)

Peer Vries, State, Economy and the Great Divergence. Great Britain and China 1650s-1850s (London: Bloomsbury, 2015).

Carl Wennerlind, “The Political Economy of Sweden’s Age of Greatness: Johan Risingh and the Hartlib Circle,” in Philipp Robinson Rössner (ed.), Economic Growth and the Origins of Modern Political Economy: Economic Reasons of State, 1500- 2000 (New York, NY; Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2016), pp. 156-186

Paul Romer: the view from Economic History

In this post I write about the connections between Paul Romer’s work, which is essentially applied theory, and the empirical work on long-run economic growth done by economic historians. How was Romer influenced by the work of economic historians? has he influenced economic history? and have his theories been confirmed by the recent work of economic historians? (preview: I will argue that the answers are: yes; not much; and no).

Addendum shortly after publishing: my point above is not that Romer is wrong in general; in fact some of his ideas *about ideas* are fundamental for us to think about growth in the past. (Read on if this isn’t clear yet.)

Paul Romer’s was a well-deserved and long-anticipated prize. Many predicted he would eventually win, including myself in my very first academic article, written when I was a undergradute and published in 2008. (alternatively, click here for an ungated version). I now find it mildly amusing how assertive I was when I wrote: “Paul Romer is going to win the Nobel Prize in economics”. I continue to believe that this was a good choice.

Many have written about the nature of his main contributions, all of which, as I have said, have been on applied theory; see for instance, see the posts in Dietrich Vollrath’s blog, here and here, or in Paul Romer’s own blog.

Romer’s work had some influence on economic history, but not much. There is, for instance, a 1995 article by Nick Crafts which looks at the Industrial Revolution from a New Growth perspective, but it is fair to say that economic historians were perhaps not quick to pick up the New Growth theory train. Part of this was surely because its implications seemed to apply mostly to frontier economies and did not seem to apply to much of human history, a limitation which Unified Growth Theory would later attempt to overcome.

And yet, Romer himself has often spoken about economic history and relied on the data of economic historians. He now seems to have won mostly due to his 1990 article, but his earlier work on increasing returns (ungated version here) had a graph from Maddison, for instance (he discusses how Maddison influenced him here). And the process of growth itself was documented by economic historians using graphs such as the following; as my friend Max Roser tweeted:

(as a side note: Max, the source for this is not the Bank of England; it is Broadberry, Campbell, Klein, Overton, and van Leeuwen; empirical work is very demanding, so citations need to be fair with the people who did the hard work in putting these figures together).

One of the most empirical papers Romer has written is “Why indeed in America?”,  which was the culmination of much of what he had done before. It was also one of the last papers he wrote before entering a writing hiatus. In this paper he explicitly argues for the complementarity of economic history and growth theory. He argues that the USA achieved economic supremacy after 1870 due to having the largest integrated market in the world. He writes:

“differences in saving and education do not explain why growth was so much faster in the United States than it was in Britain around the turn of this century. In 1870, per capita income in the United States was 75 percent of per capita income in Britain. By 1929, it had increased to 130 percent. In the intervening decades, years of education per worker increased by a factor of 2.2 in Britain and by a nearly identical factor of 2.3 in the United States. In 1929, this variable remained slightly lower in the United States. (Data are taken from Angus Maddison [1995].”

Notice that there are three empirical statements here. Romer’s story builds on these facts, so if the facts change, the story must too. Theory depends on facts.

The first fact (according to Romer) is that the US only converged to British per capita GDP levels after 1870. Second, that this was not due to matters such as education or savings. Third, the reason was market size. As economic historians, we have made much progress in measuring each of these matters since 1995. Let me consider each in turn.

Timing of convergence of the USA to Britain

The important thing to keep in mind here is that it is by no means certain that the USA had not catched up earlier. The methodological issues are complicated and in fact today’s other (and equally deserving) Nobel prize, Nordhaus, wrote a fascinating paper about the problems involved in these types of measurements. (A popular description of this work can be read here.) As far as USA vs Britain is concerned, though, Marianne Ward and John Devereux summarize the debate as follows:

“Prados De la Escosura (2000) and Ward and Devereux (2003, 2004, 2005) argue for an early US income lead using current price estimates. Broadberry (2003) and Broadberry and Irwin (2006) defend the Maddison projections while Woltjer (2015) hews to a middle ground. The literature has recently taken an unexpected turn as Peter Lindert and Jeffrey Williamson, Lindert and Williamson (2016), find a larger US lead before 1870 and one that stretches further back in time than claimed by either Prados De la Escosura (2000) or Ward and Devereux (2005).”

Comparative levels of education

Recent evidence suggests that the average years of post-primary education actually declined in Britain after about 1700. (ungated version here). This was not the case at all in the USA, where it is well-known that the state invested in high schools, so it seems unlikely that average human capital grew at similar levels in the latter part of the 19th century, as Maddison/Romer claimed.

Addendum: minutes ago when I first posted, I initially wrote “post-secondary” where I meant to write “post-primary”

Market size

I used to believe this part of Romer’s story. That was until I read this brilliant paper by Leslie Hannah: “Logistics, Market Size, and Giant Plants in the Early Twentieth Century: A Global View”. (Ungated version here). Notice that Hannah does not refer to Romer’s argument or even cite him. What he does instead is he destroys the commonly held idea that USA’s market size was larger that Europe’s already before the Great War (aka World War I). It is true that the USA had more railroads, but it also had much longer distances. In Northwestern Europe, transportation by a mix of ships, trains and horses was cheaper, especially once we consider the much denser (and highly urbanized) population. It is important to remember that prior to WWI, Europe was living the “first age of globalization”, with high levels of integration and relatively low tariffs.

So, this part of Romer’s story cannot be right.

Conclusion

In conclusion, what does this all mean? will these new facts affect where growth theory will go? only time will tell, and growth theory itself is by no means moving much these days, as Paul Romer himself has addmited in recent interviews. What these facts suggest, though, is that other things must have mattered.

As I said in the beginning, I believe that Paul Romer’s applied theory work is important (as it is that of others that might have won, such as Aghion and Howitt). The natural complementaries between the work of economic historians and applied theorists suggest that we need to listen to each other in order for science to move forward. Hopefully, new generations of economists will do a bit of both, as have some people who now work on Unified Growth.

But in the future, it is fair that the Nobel committee gives more prizes to empirical work as well. Because theory can’t live without facts, but economics Nobels have been highly biased towards theorists (whether pure or applied).

Final addendum, about one hour later than the original post: Max Roser read this post and has now corrected the citation. This is not the first time I give him a slap on the wrist about this sort of thing, but I know that Max, who is a friend and a promoter extraordinaire of this sort of work, is well-intentioned. Yet it is crucial that we insist on this being done fairly everytime, because if even Max occasionally does this wrong, that shows that this is the sort of thing that easily happens. The root cause is indirect citations, i.e. citation of someone who cited the data instead of citing the original work. Doing this takes credit away from those who did the basic empirical work, even when that is unintentional. So we all need to be careful to cite those who produced the original data.

 

 

 

 

From convergence to divergence: Portuguese economic growth, 1527-1850

By 1850 per capita incomes in Portugal were not different from what they had been in the early 1530s.

The paper “From convergence to divergence: Portuguese economic growth, 1527-1850”, by myself (Nuno Palma) and Jaime Reis, is forthcoming in the Journal of Economic History.

Despite the fact that by 1850 per capita incomes in Portugal were not different from what they had been in the early 1530s, starting in the early 1630s there was a persistent upward trend which accelerated after 1710 and peaked 40 years later.

At that point, per capita income was high by European standards, though a bit behind the most advanced Western European economies. But as the second half of the eighteenth century unfolded, a phase of economic decline was initiated. This continued into the nineteenth century so that Portugal became one of the most backward economies of Europe, precisely as the era of modern economic growth was beginning in several other Western European countries.

Portugal would then have to wait until the 1950s to start catching up.

You can find an open access version of the paper here.

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Call for papers: Revista de Historia Económica-Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, Special Issue on Portuguese Economic and Social History

Revista de Historia Económica-Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History Fast Track Meeting: Special Issue on Portuguese Economic and Social History17 November, 2018, Lisbon

Submissions are welcome for a Fast Track session to be held during the 2018 APHES meeting in Lisbon. All papers must be submitted in English and cover some aspect of Portuguese economic history, including the former colonies (prior to independence; e.g. a paper can be about Brazil, but only prior to 1821). Comparative papers are welcome.

Anyone is free to submit, but submissions from young scholars are particularly welcome. Revista de Historia Económica-Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History will publish a special issue on Portuguese economic and social history based on some of the papers presented in this fast track sessionThe scientific commitee will then send the best papers to be refereed but a decision will be taken within without a long delay and articles will appear in print within a relatively short time.  

The scientific committee will be composed of Blanca Sánchez Alonso (Universidad San Pablo-CEU Spain and RHE-JILAEH chief editor), Nuno Palma (University of Manchester, UK) and Jaime Reis (ICS, University of Lisbon). 

Nuno Palma (University of Manchester, UK) will serve as the guest editor for the special issue. 

Those interested should submit their papers to RHE-JILAEH via the manuscript central system no later than 15th October 2018 https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/revista-de-historia-economica-journal-of-iberian-and-latin-american-economic-history. When submitting through manuscript central, please mention in the cover letter that you would like your paper to be considered for Fast Track. The most promising papers will be selected for the Fast Track Meeting. Authors will be informed whether their paper will be selected to present by November 1, 2018.

Best Regards,

Blanca Sánchez Alonso (Universidad San Pablo-CEU, Spain and RHE-JILAEH chief editor)

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Can autocracy promote literacy? evidence from a cultural alignment success story

What can the XXth century Portuguese experience teach us about the interaction between political regimes and literacy attainment?

Here’s a recent paper on this topic by Jaime Reis and myself. The CEPR version is gated, but you can find a free access version here. Here’s the abstract:

“Do countries with less democratic forms of government necessarily have lower literacy rates as a consequence? Using a random sample of 4,600+ individuals from military archives in Portugal, we show that 20-year old males were twice as likely to end up literate under an authoritarian regime than under a democratic one. Our results are robust to controlling for a host of factors including economic growth, the disease environment, and regional fixed effects. We argue for a political economy and cultural explanation for the success of the authoritarian regime in promoting basic education.”

In a sense, this is a paper in the spirit of Edmund Burke’s argument that social change needs to be gradual, and cannot be changed by top-down design overnight.

To contextualize the paper further, note that Portugal during the first half of the XXth century was very poor. In 1910 it had a GDP per capita of international GK $1228, compared with 4,611 for England, and hence closer to that of Côte d’Ivoire today (1,195 in 2010). Even as late as 1950 Portugal, at IGK $2,086, was behind Mozambique today (with IGK $1876 in 2010), and was clearly poorer than Cape Verde today its last avaliable data year, 2008 (IGK $2,735). Source: the 2013 Maddison Project. (I haven’t updated these numbers using the new MPD but the general pattern won’t have changed much).

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